Fully
Informed Jury Association
Post
Office
REPRINT
State
Language on Jury Nullification
Citizens
Must Claim Rights:
Founders
Gave Juries the Right to Determine Law
Spotlight
March 20, 2000
Some
say jury nullification is the most practical way to stop the juggernaut police
state.
By
Tom Stahl
The
“Washington Post published a front page story entitled, “In Jury Rooms, a Form
of Civil Protest Grows,” last year. According to the Post article, jurors are
not always following judges’ instructions to the letter.
The
article recounted that sometimes in jury trials, when those facts which the
judge chooses to allow into evidence indicate that the defendant broke the law,
jurors look at the facts quite differently from the way the judge instructed
them to. The jurors do not say, “On the basis of these facts the defendant is
guilty.’’
Instead,
the jurors say, “On the basis of these facts the law is wrong,” and they vote to
acquit. Or, they may vote to acquit because they believe that the law is being
unjustly applied, or because some government conduct in the case has been so
egregious that they cannot reward it with a conviction.
In
short, a passion for justice invades the jury room. The jurors begin judging the
law and the government, as well as the facts, and they render their verdict
according to conscience. This is called jury
nullification.
Dr.
Jack Kevorkian, recently convicted, was acquitted several times in the past,
despite his admission of the government’s facts, of assisting the suicide of
terminally ill patients who wanted to die. Those acquittals were probably due to
jury nullification. And Kevorkian might have been acquitted again if the trial
judge had allowed him to present his evidence, testimony of the deceased’s
relatives, to the jury. A corollary of jury nullification is greater latitude
for the jury to hear all of the evidence.
The
Post took a dim view of this and suggested that jury nullification is an
aberration, a kind of unintended and unwanted side-effect of our constitutional
system of letting juries decide cases. But the Post couldn’t be more wrong. Far
from being an unintended side-effect, jury nullification is explicitly
authorized in the constitutions of 24 states.
ALL
CRIMINAL CASES
The
constitutions of
Article
23 of
In
the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as
of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain a conviction. The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil
proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in
controversy exceeds the sum of five thousand dollars, shall be inviolably
preserved.
Art.
1, Sec. 19, of
In
all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law
and the facts.
Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed. Cruel and unusual
punishments shall not be inflicted, but all penalties shall be proportioned to
the offense. In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to
determine the law, and the facts under the direction of the Court as to the law,
and the right of new trial, as in civil cases.
Art.
1, Sec. 1 of Georgia’s Constitution says:
The
right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate, except that the court shall
render judgment without the verdict of a jury in all civil cases where no
issuable defense is filed and where a jury is not demanded in writing by either
party. In criminal cases, the defendant shall have a public and speedy trial by
an impartial jury; and the jury shall be judges of the law and the
facts.
These
constitutional jury nullification provisions endure despite decades of hostile
judicial interpretation.
LIBEL
CASES
Twenty
other states currently include jury nullification provisions in their
constitutions under their sections on freedom of speech, specifically with
respect to libel cases. These provisions, listed below, typically
state:
....
in all indictments for libel, the jury shall have the right to determine the law
and the facts under the direction of the court.
But
In
all indictments or prosecutions for libel, the truth of the alleged libel may be
given in evidence, and the jury shall be the judges of the law and
facts.
8);
These phrases suggest that the jury has a right to determine the law in more than just libel cases.
The
.
. . and in all indictments for libel, the jury shall have a right to determine
the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other criminal
cases.
The
phrase “under the direction of the court,’’ omitted by five states, provides for
the trial judge to give directions, like road directions which the jury may or
may not choose to follow, to assist the jury in its
deliberations.
Our
forefathers did not intend by this phrase for the trial judge to infringe in any
way upon the sole discretion of the jury in rendering its verdict. Although
later courts have held otherwise, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Nelson v.
State, 2 Swan 482 (1852), described the proper roles of the judge and jury as
follows: The judge is a witness who testifies as to what the law is, and the
jury is free to accept or reject his testimony like any
other.
The
Maine Constitution affirms these roles in its section on
libel:
...
and in all indictments for libels, the jury, after having received the direction
of the court, shall have a right to determine, at their discretion, the law and
the fact.
In
addition, 40 state constitutions, like the
And
34 state constitutions expound on the principle of all political power being
inherent in the people by saying that “the people ... have at all times ... a
right to alter, reform, or abolish their government in such manner as they may
think proper,” or words to similar effect.
For
example, the Pennsylvania Constitution declares that:
“All
power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their
authority and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness. For the
advancement of these ends they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible
right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may
think proper.”
If
the people have all power, and have at all times a right to alter, reform or
abolish their government in such manner as they may think proper, then they
certainly have the right of jury nullification, which is tantamount to altering
or reforming their government when they come together on juries to decide
cases.
A
single nullification verdict against a particular law may or may not alter or
reform the government, but thousands of such verdicts certainly do. Witness the
decisive role of jury nullification in establishing freedom of speech and press
in the American Colonies, defeating the Fugitive Slave Act and ending alcohol
prohibition.
Of
special note is the right of revolution in the New Hampshire
Constitution.
Government
being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security, of the whole
community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family,
or class of men; therefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted, and
public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are
ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, or establish
a new government. The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and
oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of
mankind.
If
the people have the ultimate right of revolution to protect their liberties,
then they certainly also have the lesser included and more gentle right of jury
nullification to protect their liberties.
It
should also be noted that
Among
the natural rights, some are, in their very nature unalienable, because no
equivalent can be given or received for them. Of this kind are the Rights of
Conscience.
If
the right of conscience is unalienable, then it can not be taken away from
people when they enter the courthouse door to serve on juries. The people have
an inherent and unalienable right to vote their conscience when rendering jury
verdicts.
There
is no doubt that jury nullification was one of the rights and powers that the
people were exercising in 1791 when the Bill of Rights of the United States
Constitution was adopted. As legal historian Lawrence Friedman has
written:
In
American legal theory, jury-power was enormous, and subject to few controls.
There was a maxim of law that the jury was judge both of law and of fact in
criminal cases. This idea was particularly strong in the first Revolutionary
generation when memories of royal justice were fresh.
Jury
nullification is therefore one of the “rights . . . retained by the people” in
the Ninth Amendment.
And
it is one of the “powers . . . reserved . . . to the people” in the Tenth
Amendment.
Jury
nullification is decentralization of political power. It is the people’s most
important veto in our constitutional system. The jury vote is the only time the
people ever vote on the application of a real law in real life. All other votes
are for hypotheticals.
Tom
Stahl is a former FIJA Board member and practicing attorney from
----- Original Message -----From: Nedd KareivaTo: Edward C. NoonanSent: Wednesday, July 15, 2009 6:44 AMSubject: Re: Super American Grand Jury Denied!
I had to read this several times to grasp the content and depth of Sgt. Harrington's opinion. It appears that an implied interpretation of what he said about Judge Lamberth is that any court ruling about this or any citizen's presentment has to come by way of an attorney pleading the case thru the courts and not thru private citizens. Lamberth appears to have said that citizens can convene and make their cases but the courts have no duty to accept them in that fashion since no attorney, prosecutor or similar official was involved in any way in the process. Lamberth's ruling would appear to be proper in the view of Leo Donofrio, who has stated on his Natural Born Citizen blog that any judicial findings of merit from the American Grand Jury (AGJ), if they were to be made, would have no legal binding nature to them since they were not done thru established procedures of the court system.
I was hoping to read something from Donofrio on this but as of now he has nothing on his website on it. I would like to hear what he has to say since I have found him the most constitutionally credible attorney filing suit against Obama (currently dismissed) to this point. His concerns about the AGJ seem to be fairly reasonable in nature and I hope he will take this up.
Judge Lamberth was during the Clinton years Judicial Watch's favorite attorney and he spared the Clinton Administration no mercy on any of its shenanigans and consistently found favor with JW against Clinton. He has generally been viewed favorably by JW and its supporters for following the rule of law for many years. I'm neither surprised nor unsurprised by Judge Lamberth's decision but I do find it interesting to note.
Along those lines, I have written JW on at least two or three occasions as to why they won't take up the citizenship issue and their silence has been deafening. One website quoted Tom Fitton, president of JW, as saying he didn't think there was anything to Obama's eligibility but didn't elaborate. I could not locate anything on JW's website to that end either. I do suspect that even the nation's self-proclaimed top judicial watchdog and perhaps Judge Lamberth as well may be afraid of Obama and why they both won't touch it. JW might be concerned about their 501 (C) 3 status as well and they have had the IRS audit them back in the 90s during Clinton days. Perhaps they don't want a repeat of that.
I confess I didn't know much about the Feres Doctrine til now, though I have heard of it. The court ruling, linked on Jag Hunters, was interesting to read and I must admit that I do find Lamberth's findings, if accurately addressed here by Sgt. Harrington, proper - except for his one glaring and inarguable point - "The Feres Doctrine has no standing if the person in government employ has no standing to hold the office of the supposed protection of said office.".
On that basis alone, Lamberth should have not summarily dismissed this matter, if that's exactly what occurred, which I suspect from Harrington's comments is the case. I think he should take it up on that premise alone and then give guidelines to legal filings the good guys need to make. On that premise, I say to Judge Lamberth, "reconsider!"
Regards,
Nedd
__,_._,___